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I. THE AGGREGATION OF INFORMATION RESULTING IN A DIGITAL
FOOTPRINT AND THE CORRESPONDING PRIVACY PROTECTIONS IN
THE UNITED STATES AND UNITED KINGDOM
Routine. Wake up. Shower. Get ready. Go to Starbucks.
Guzzle coffee. Text. Drive to school. Walk to class. Leave class. Drive
home for lunch. Text. Check social media. Drive back to school. Walk
to class. Leave class. Get into the car. Drive home. Arrive home. Send
Snapchats. Text. Go back to school for meetings. Arrive back home.
Post picture on Instagram. Read for class. Make dinner. Text. Read for
class. Listen to music. Get ready for bed. Sleep. Do it all over again.
If a law enforcement official wanted to determine an
individual’s identity or trace the individual’s movements, the official
would be able to create a decently accurate profile within a day. Since
one’s movements are generally the same everyday with little deviation,
physically following someone would provide a wealth of information.
In addition, since our society extensively uses technology, each of us
generates a digital footprint that the officer could track by getting
access to the following: car GPS, iPhone location, internet history,
social media accounts, video surveillance footage from street cameras,
etc.1 From just this aggregation of information collected in a short
period of time, the officer would be able to determine, among other
things, the individual’s name, address, school, classroom location
within the building, friends, family members, stores frequented, model
of car, and credit card information. Besides these typical forms of
government surveillance, individuals in public are also exposed to
sousveillance,2 a term used to describe citizens’ ability to record events
1
Laura K. Donohue, The Fourth Amendment in a Digital World, 71 N.Y.U.
ANN. SURV. AM. L. 553, 554 (2017).
2
See Jascha Hoffman, Sousveillance, THE NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE, Dec.
10, 2006, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/26/books/why-1984-is-a-2017must-read.html (The etymology of surveillance and sousveillance is as follows:
“Surveillance, from the French for ‘watching over,’ refers to the monitoring of
people by some higher authority—the police, for instance. Now there’s
sousveillance, or ‘watching from below.’ It refers to the reverse tactic: the monitoring
of authorities.”).
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on their cellphones or other devices and their capability to disseminate
the recording to a wide network.3
Although surveillance produces several advantages including
risk assessment, deterrence, data collection, and crime solving, the
aforementioned scenario does call to mind Orwell’s Big Brother and
Bentham’s panopticon.4 This dystopian feeling of always being
watched is only one of many issues to consider in addition to data
storage, anonymity issues, and privacy rights.
This reduction of privacy, the ability to be free from
government intrusion and the view of others5 draws to the forefront
several questions: (1) what is considered public, and (2) what
protections are in place to keep the intimate details of our lives private?
This comment will discuss how the rapid advancements in technology
“blur the distinction between private space and the public domain,”
which complicates the framework on which the courts rely.6 The law
needs to keep pace with technological advancement so that discretion
to create baseline rules is not left completely in the hands of law
enforcement.7
The privacy protections offered to citizens depend upon the
country being discussed. This is due to varying societal values,
constitutions/laws/acts that are in place, legal systems, and population
3
See Mary D. Fan, Privacy, Public Disclosure, Police Body Cameras: Policy Splits, 68
ALA. L. REV. 395, 406 (2016).
4
See GEORGE ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR (Houghton Mifflin
Harcourt, 1949) (Nineteen Eighty-Four is a dystopian novel that illustrates an
omnipotent government which extensively watches and controls the lives of the
citizens of Oceania through the use of CCTV and the limitation of available
information). Bentham’s Panopticon was originally implemented in prisons, which
allowed around the clock surveillance from a central viewing point for guards. Fan,
supra note 3, at 407. The panopticon promoted compliance and deterred bad
behavior as inmates did not know when or if they were being watched. Id. This notion
has since been applied to outside situations with regard to the feeling of being
watched. Id.
5
See Bryce Clayton Newell, Crossing Lenses: Policing’s New Visibility and the Role
of “Smartphone Journalism” as a Form of Freedom-Preserving Reciprocal Surveillance, 14 U. ILL.
J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 59, 95 (2014).
6
Donohue, supra note 1, at 582.
7
See Fan, supra note 3, at 402.
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sizes. Although the United States and United Kingdom share “[t]he
fundamental common law principles . . . traced back to the Magna
Carta,”8 the American and United Kingdom approaches to privacy
differ. The implications of these approaches to privacy will be seen
later in the comment through a discussion of surveillance and
sousveillance and their impact on individuals’ objective and subjective
privacy rights while in public.9
Although the United Kingdom’s system may provide some
useful techniques for employing surveillance that could be used to help
balance the crime control agenda and the constitutional privacy issues
faced by the United States, the United States would be unable to
implement the extensive United Kingdom mass surveillance system
effectively. Several factors would significantly inhibit this
implementation, namely size and the opposition the government
would face. Because of the concerns mentioned above, the United
States requires a different approach to surveillance; a balance needs to
be struck between the government’s disclosure obligations and
citizens’ privacy rights in order for the system to be effective.
This comment proceeds in seven parts. Part I served as a brief
introduction to the topic of surveillance and its relevance to our
everyday lives and rights. Part II of this comment explains the
development of surveillance since its inception as well as its
intersection with privacy rights. Part III of this comment compares the
United States and the United Kingdom’s interpretations of the right to
privacy through history, laws and regulations currently in place, and
case law. Part IV of this comment debates the advantages and
disadvantages of surveillance by analyzing its various methods such as
Closed Circuit Television, Policy Body Cameras, and Sousveillance.
Part V of this comment evaluates and scrutinizes the possibility of
implementing the UK system in the US due to several problems. Part
VI of this comment suggests several potential ways in which clarity can
Nadia Shamsi, The Search for Truth: A Comparative Look at Criminal Jury Trials
in the United States and England, 22 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 203, 203 (2016).
9
See Fan, supra note 3, at 406 (stating that, today, sousveillance is when “the
power of recording people or events is put in the hands of everyday people who can
cheaply acquire a small sousveillance device, such as a cell phone camera, and
disseminate the recordings and images all over the world via the Internet”).
8
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be provided to subside some of the confusion surrounding privacy
rights and surveillance. Finally, Part VII summarizes and concludes the
comment.
II. WHAT IS SURVEILLANCE: A TIMELINE OF PROGRESSION AND ITS
INTERSECTION WITH PRIVACY
Surveillance is everywhere and infiltrates our everyday lives.
Some examples given by acclaimed Georgetown Professor of Law,
Laura Donohue, include: “Wi-Fi and Bluetooth signals; GPS chips; . . .
automated license plate readers; network collection data; . . . Internet
protocol databases; financial transactions; consumer purchases; closed
circuit television; remote biometric identification; and unmanned aerial
systems.”10 These methods of collecting information about individuals
raise privacy concerns because “locational data, collected in bulk, yields
deep insight into individuals’ lives.”11 This data reveals personal
information, including where we have been, who we were with, and
places we frequent, to name a few.
Although technology has allowed for new forms of
surveillance in addition to a new set of privacy rights challenges,
surveillance is not a new issue; these issues “can be dated back to the
times of the Magna Carta in 1215, when it became desirable for nobles
to monitor and check the wealth of the English King John.”12 The
types of government mass surveillance that will be discussed later on
also are not a new phenomenon; these programs began around the
time of “the First and Second World Wars” including national
databases as well as census registration which were used as modes of
obtaining and recording information about individuals in society.13
Before the proliferation of advanced technology, gathering records and
surveilling the public required “a great deal of manpower.”14 The
Donohue, supra note 1, at 613.
Id.
12
Briana Sojeong Lee, Security over Surveillance in the US, in 4 THE PPE
REVIEW: PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS, AND ECONOMICS 8, 13 (Michelle Beauchamp et al.
eds., 2017).
13
Id. at 11, 13.
14
Jeramie D. Scott, Social Media and Government Surveillance: The Case for Better
Privacy Protection for Our Newest Public Space, 12 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 151, 154 (2017).
10
11
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mobility, cost, and ease with which these devices can be used changed
the perspective of those utilizing surveillance and those being watched
because surveillance placement no longer required significant costbenefit analysis.15 In contrast, the intrusive nature of these
advancements has led to changing perspectives on privacy as well. The
“traditional theories of privacy . . . focus was on actual threats to
privacy,” but after these technological advancements, “a perceived
threat to privacy in public” came to light.16 An actual threat to privacy
would be individuals intruding into one’s home—therefore literally
invading their privacy—while perceived threats to privacy are
subjective feelings of invasion while in public.
Due to the widespread reach of social media and the Internet,
surveillance has been placed in the hands of anyone who possesses a
cell phone with the ability to take pictures or record video. As
technology advances and surveillance increases, what society’s
expectation of privacy encompasses changes as well because
surveillance and sousveillance have the ability to impede privacy rights
while in public.17 Whenever the topic of surveillance is mentioned, the
references to Orwell’s Big Brother and Bentham’s Panopticon are not
far behind.18 These concepts reflect the idea of being constantly
watched—Orwell’s about citizens being watched by the government
and Bentham’s about prisoners being watched by the guards.19
Technology has resulted in a dramatic shift in policing values and
methods and has “thereby both raised the stakes and lowered the
barriers to intensive, intrusive surveillance.”20
III. PRIVACY AND SURVEILLANCE IN THE UNITED STATES AND THE
UNITED KINGDOM
Although the United States and United Kingdom share “the
fundamental common law principles . . . traced back to the Magna
15
Rachel Levinson-Waldman, Hiding in Plain Sight: A Fourth Amendment
Framework for Analyzing Government Surveillance in Public, 66 EMORY L.J. 527, 562 (2017).
16
Scott, supra note 14, at 154.
17
See Donohue, supra note 1, at 680.
18
See GEORGE ORWELL, supra note 4; see Fan, supra note 3, at 407.
19
Id.
20
Levinson-Waldman, supra note 15, at 562.
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Carta,” the American and United Kingdom legal systems “diverge in
terms of jury selection, the jury process, roles of the barristers, judges,
and defendants, and the use of evidence.”21 These systematic
dissimilarities have resulted in differing approaches to surveillance and
privacy rights.
A. Privacy and Surveillance in the United Kingdom
1. Progression of Surveillance in the United Kingdom
The United Kingdom has become the “most watched citizenry
in Europe” and possibly the world.22 According to the former Director
of the National CCTV23 Users Group, “there are ‘more cameras here
in proportion to the population than anywhere else, including the
United States.’”24 These CCTVs were installed in the 1990s under the
crime control model.25 Before the invention of CCTV to monitor
public areas, law enforcement typically relied on “street patrols,
undercover officers, informants, and members of the general public”
to gather intelligence about the community.26 As of 2011 data, there
were “approximately 1.85 million public CCTV cameras operating in
the United Kingdom, with the average Briton caught on camera
approximately 70 times each day.”27 The number has since grown to
Shamsi, supra note 8, at 203, 225.
BENJAMIN J. GOOLD, CCTV AND POLICING: PUBLIC AREA
SURVEILLANCE AND POLICE PRACTICES IN BRITAIN 1, n.3 (Per-Olof Wikström et al.
eds., 2004).
23
Id. at 12. (Closed Circuit Television, colloquially known as CCTV, is
defined as “a system in which a number of video cameras are connected in a closed
circuit or loop, with the images produced being sent to a central television monitor.”)
24
Dipesh Gadher, Smile, you’re on 300 candid cameras . . . , SUNDAY TIMES
(LONDON) (February 14, 1999); See also Goold, supra note 22, at 1–2, 1 n.3.
25
See Brandon C. Welsh, David P. Farrington & Sema A. Taheri, Effectiveness
and Social Costs of Public Area Surveillance for Crime Prevention, 11 ANN. REV. L. & SOC.
SCI. 111, 112 (2015); see generally Douglas Evan Beloof, The Third Model of Criminal
Process: The Victim Participation Model, UTAH L. REV. 289, 292-93 (1999). (The crime
control model is a methodology of law enforcement, which predominantly values
efficiently reducing crime. In contrast, there is the due process model, which values
the importance of individual rights and liberties as well as limiting government
power.).
26
Goold, supra note 22, at 3, 96.
27
Welsh, supra note 25, at 112.
21
22
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produce a “network of four million closed-circuit cameras” even
before the “deployment of an estimated 2,000 additional cameras worn
by police officers.”28
This dramatic increase in surveillance in the United Kingdom
was introduced with surprisingly limited backlash.29 At the time of its
implementation, there were a number of factors that contributed to
the easy transition of surveillance into everyday life including: (1) a
general societal “shift in thinking about crime and issues relating to
criminal justice” and (2) “politicians and policy-makers were in search
of a new solution to the problem of crime and . . . a way of convincing
the public that they were serious about crime prevention.”30 The desire
for change and solutions for crime brought about an overall approval
of surveillance by the government and the public where they
“accept[ed] at face value claims about the CCTV’s supposed
benefits.”31 Additionally, it was decently well known and implied that
criticism of CCTV and its implementation were not welcomed by the
Home Office, a department of the government which funded a
significant portion of the surveillance program.32
CCTV and other forms of surveillance have evolved and now
allow the police to have equipment to aggregate large quantities of
information on a constant basis.33 Technology, specifically the
abundance of CCTVs, has influenced the methodology and practice of
policing and how law enforcement allocates their resources in the
United Kingdom.34
2. Laws and Regulations in Place
Because the United Kingdom lacks a written constitution that
explicitly lists the rights to which citizens are entitled, privacy

28
29
30
31
32
33
34

Fan, supra note 3, at 419.
Goold, supra note 22, at 19–21.
Id. at 20, 27.
Id. at 24, 26. See also Fan, supra note 3, at 419–20.
Goold, supra note 22, at 26.
See Goold, supra note 22, at 96, 167.
Id. at 167–177.
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protection has encountered several foundational issues.35 Traditionally,
UK law has “failed to recognize the existence of any general right to
privacy,” but there are “legal protection[s] for the freedom of
expression, the protection of reputation, and the right to privacy.”36
The courts have drawn from several different sources “to develop a
notion of privacy, in each case extending the scope of the existing law
by way of analogy and implication.”37 For example, “trespass, nuisance,
breach of copyright, and defamation” are some of the causes of action
that have been utilized in an effort to promote a right to privacy.38
Thus, creating a right through a compilation of sources and laws ad
hoc, rather than through a binding document, has therefore proven
difficult.
The Humans Rights Act was adopted by the United Kingdom
in 1988.39 This Act “provides for the incorporation of the European
Convention on Human Rights into domestic law.”40 The European
Convention on Human Rights recognizes “a citizen’s right to ‘respect
for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.’”41
Although this may seem to explicitly provide a right to privacy, the
interpretation of this provision does not convey the application to
public spaces.42
As previously mentioned, the United Kingdom is the “most
watched citizenry in Europe.”43 Despite this widespread use of
surveillance, the “central government has been reluctant to impose
legal restraints on the use of this technology by the police and local
authorities.”44 Because of this void of restraints or explicit rights, the
Id. at 90.
Id. at 90. See also Alexandra Paslawsky, The Growth of Social Media Norms and
Governments’ Attempts at Regulation, 35 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1485, 1500 (2012).
37
Goold, supra note 22, at 91.
38
Id.
39
Paslawsky, supra note 36, at 1500–01.
40
Id.
41
Goold, supra note 22, at 92; Council of Europe, European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, as amended by Protocols Nos. 11 and
14 (Nov. 4, 1950), http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3b04.html.
42
See Goold, supra note 22, at 92.
43
Id. at 1 & n.3.
44
Id. at 89.
35
36
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“legitimate use of CCTV and the limits that should be placed on public
area surveillance has fallen to local officials and police officers.”45 The
typical justification for the use of surveillance has been the security
rationale which is a very generalized, expansive power regarding public
safety concerns.46 However, such a rationale could very easily be
manipulated and be made applicable to many different situations.
Allowing vast discretion with little to no supervision or limit is grounds
for abuse.
The United Kingdom has implemented its own FOIA,
Freedom of Information Act 2000, which “creates a right of access to
information held by public authorities, subject to exemptions.”47 The
notions and rights presented in this Act have promoted the idea of
transparency and have allowed for the use of CCTV video recordings
as evidence in criminal trials.48
3. Case Law
In Friedl v. Austria (1996), the European Court of Human
Rights grappled with the concept of surveillance and infringement on
privacy rights.49 The plaintiff in this case, Friedl, was attending a public
demonstration in Vienna when he was photographed by police, which
he claimed violated Article 8 of the European Convention on Human
Rights that recognizes “a citizen’s right to ‘respect for his private and
family life, his home and his correspondence.”50 He argued that his
Id.
See Paslawsky, supra note 36, at 1535.
47
Fan, supra note 3, at 422; Freedom of Information Act 2000 c. 36 (UK),
https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/36/pdfs/ukpga_20000036_en.pdf.
48
See Shamsi, supra note 8, at 223.
49
See Friedl v. Austria, 21 Eur. Ct. H.R. 83 (1996).
50
Goold, supra note 22, at 92. Article 8 of the European Convention of
Human Rights states in its completion:
Right to respect for private and family life[:]
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home
and his correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of
this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a
democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the
economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or
45
46
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privacy rights were violated by “the taking of the photograph, the
establishing of his identity, and the recording of his personal data, as
well as the storing of this material.”51 The Court dismissed the case,
explaining that Article 8 of the Convention applied only to private
spheres of life, not public life, so he was not extended those privacy
protections.52 As a result of this case, the Court began to discuss the
dichotomy of private versus public life. Civil liberties groups and
academics alike have argued that the court’s discussion can be
interpreted to mean that “privacy rights may in certain circumstances,
be asserted in public places.”53
In Peck v. United Kingdom (2003), the European Court of Human
Rights considered privacy rights and the role of Article 8 of the
Convention which reinvigorated the discussion of private versus
public life and the corresponding expectations of privacy.54 In this case,
the plaintiff argued that his Article 8 Right to Respect of Privacy was
violated when a local authority disclosed CCTV recordings and
photographs, “which resulted in images of himself being published and
broadcast on a local and national level.”55 He also contested this
disclosure because “no effective remedy existed in relation to the
violation of his Art. 8 right” so this action also violated Article 13 of
the Convention, which identifies the right to an effective remedy.56 The
Court acknowledged “meaningful distinctions can be drawn between
different types of public activities and circumstances.”57 However, in
crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the
rights and freedoms of others.
Council of Europe, European Convention of Human Rights (Nov. 4 1950),
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf.
51
Goold, supra note 22, at 92.
52
Id. at 93.
53
Goold, supra note 22, at 94.
54
See generally Peck v. United Kingdom, 36 Eur. Ct. H.R. 41 ECHR (2003).
55
Id. at 41.
56
Id.; Council of Europe, European Convention of Human Rights (Nov. 4, 1950),
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf. (stating the following
in Article 13: “[r]ight to an effective remedy[:] [e]veryone whose rights and freedoms
as set forth in this Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a
national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons
acting in an official capacity.”).
57
Goold, supra note 22, at 94–95, 94 n.17.
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this case, the problem was with the disclosure, not with the
surveillance; the surveillance was justified by the legitimate aim of
public safety.58 Therefore, although this case discussed privacy and
acknowledged its application to different circumstances, its aim was
disclosure. Ultimately, Article 8 only requires a “‘respect’ for an
individual’s private life” and it has yet to be interpreted “to give rise to
a general right of privacy.”59
The death of Ian Tomlinson at the G20 British riots in
London, England in 2009 and the ensuing investigation and trial
provided an important new piece of surveillance: citizens’ media.60
Tomlinson was a bystander of the riots and was struck by a police
officer with a baton “without any apparent provocation.”61 He
eventually succumbed to the injuries he sustained.62 All of this was
unintentionally captured on the cell phone of another individual at the
riot, and the video “has now been viewed nearly a million times on . . .
YouTube.”63 This incident provoked an investigation and eventually
led to a trial for the officer.64 The officer was acquitted of
manslaughter, but the recognition of citizens’ media and its ability to
hold the police accountable had lasting effects.65 Citizens’ media has
now led to a new method of surveillance called sousveillance, which
permits individuals to record interactions with police for accountability
purposes.66
B. Privacy and Surveillance in the United States
1. Progression of Surveillance in the United States
The surveillance system in the United States combines many
different sources of information, including traffic cameras, police body
cameras, CCTV, and individuals’ cellphone recordings/social media.
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66

Id. at 95.
Id.
See Newell, supra note 5, at 95.
Id. at 95.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See Newell, supra note 5, at 95.
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Over the course of the “past decade, the United States experienced a
rather dramatic growth in the use of CCTV cameras in a wide array of
public places.”67 The increased use of sousveillance augmented the
increase in CCTV. Sousveillance explains “how recording is no longer
conducted overhead by someone with power over the subject, a
directionality formerly denoted by the French preposition sur in
surveillance.”68 Citizens now have their own form of surveillance
through technology to serve as a remedy for the uneven balance of
surveillance capabilities between the government and the public. This
form of surveillance is seen when “the power of recording people or
events is put in the hands of everyday people who can cheaply acquire
a small sousveillance device, such as a cell phone camera and
disseminate the recordings and images all over the world via the
Internet [sic].”69 This recording and distribution ability changes the
power dynamic between law enforcement and citizens by promoting
checks and balances where each is able to hold the other accountable.
Since approximately two-thirds of Americans use social media
accounts, social media has served as an effective platform to allow
citizens to use their cellphones and other devices to record or
photograph and then subsequently disperse the content to a
widespread network of people around the world.70 These changes in
technology have “blurred the lines between private citizen and
journalist” because “many of our images of current events come from
bystanders with a ready cell phone or digital camera, rather than a
traditional film crew.”71
2. Law in Place
The United States has a written constitution, which dictates
through several avenues that individuals in the United States have a
fundamental right to privacy. The Fourth Amendment states:

Welsh, supra note 25, at 112.
Fan, supra note 3, at 406.
69
Id.
70
See Scott, supra note 14, at 151.
71
Kermit V. Lipez, The First Amendment and the Police in the Digital Age, 69 ME.
L. REV. 215, 221 (2017).
67
68
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The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.72
The Fourth Amendment protects individuals from
unreasonable searches and seizures and establishes a person’s right to
privacy; the Supreme Court in Griswold v. Connecticut explained that the
right to privacy could be inferred through the “zones of privacy,” or
areas safe from government intrusion, found and protected within the
penumbra of several different amendments.73
Thus, the right to privacy has been deemed a fundamental right
and is deeply rooted in our society’s values and consciousness.74 There
have been various cases on the topic of privacy and its potential for
infringement, which have led to many discussions on the dichotomy
of private and public spaces. The general understanding is that “privacy
is ‘dead’ once you walk out your front door or expose your activities
to anyone else.”75 The Fourth Amendment and the Third Party
Doctrine76 have led the Supreme Court to utilize the “assumption of
risk” concept, where once information is revealed to a third party, it is
no longer protected by the Fourth Amendment and the individual

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (“[S]pecific guarantees in
the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that
help give them life and substance . . . Various guarantees create zones of privacy”).
74
See Paslawsky, supra note 36, at 1538.
75
Scott Skinner-Thompson, Performative Privacy, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1673,
1675 (2017).
76
Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the Third Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV. 561,
563 (2009) (“The ‘third-party doctrine’ is the Fourth Amendment rule that governs
collection of evidence from third parties in criminal investigations. The rule is simple:
By disclosing to a third party, the subject gives up all of his Fourth Amendment rights
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assumes the risk of disclosure.77 But this concept of losing one’s right
to privacy upon exiting their front door or revealing something to a
third party does not coincide with our technologically dependent
society. The way we communicate and live our lives leaves us with “no
meaningful choice in today’s world as to whether or not a digital
footprint” is created, which complicates further the interpretation of
public and private.78 Even in public, people have expectations of
privacy—expectations that have since been acknowledged as protected
by the Supreme Court dependent upon the location and the
circumstances.
The disclosure and dissemination of the recordings that are a
product of surveillance or sousveillance require a balance between the
“two revered democratic values of transparency and privacy.”79 The
Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) was enacted to “give people
the right to demand access to records held by the government to
facilitate transparency, guard against abuses, and build public trust.”80
Each state now has a freedom of information law permitting citizens
to request records.81 For example, the Pennsylvania Right to Know
Law is a “series of laws designed to guarantee that the public has access
to public records of governmental bodies.”82 Another example is the
New York Freedom of Information Law, “a series of laws designed to
guarantee that the public has access to public records of governmental
bodies in New York.”83

77
Skinner-Thompson, supra note 75, at 1680–81 (explaining that assumption
of risk means “when individuals volunteer information to others” they are assuming
the risk that what they reveal may be exposed to the public).
78
Id. at 1679. See Donohue, supra note 1, at 647.
79
Fan, supra note 3, at 401.
80
Id. at 411. See The Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C.S. § 552
(LexisNexis 2017).
81
Fan, supra note 3, at 411.
82
Pennsylvania FOIA Laws (National Freedom of Information Coalition,
2017), http://www.nfoic.org/pennsylvania-foia-laws; 65 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 67.101
(LexisNexis through 2017).
83
New York FOIA Laws (National Freedom of Information Coalition,
2017), http://www.nfoic.org/new-york-foia-laws; N.Y. Pub. Off. Law § 86 (Lexis
Advance through 2017).
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FOIA has had vast courtroom implications due to the act
permitting the disclosure of the recordings and photographs produced
from surveillance and sousveillance.84 These photographs and
recordings could be used as evidence in a criminal trial, which “can
bring that outside event directly into the courtroom to support or
contradict [] testimony.”85 The display of surveillance or sousveillance
footage can eliminate the “built-in credibility gap”86 where bias is given
in favor of the police officer’s testimony. On the other hand, to protect
privacy, the Stored Communications Act (“SCA”), contained within
the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (“ECPA”), “prohibits
unauthorized access to stored communications, such as email, and
disclosure of their contents.”87 Both of these acts in conjunction with
one another are somewhat effective ways of “balancing these privacy
interests with the important societal interest in promoting effective and
efficient police work.”88
3. Case Law
There were “no major Fourth Amendment cases for 100
years” until the Supreme Court decided Boyd v. United States in 1886.89
In Boyd v. United States, the topic of informational security and
infiltration into one’s “privately held . . . information” was discussed.90
The Supreme Court in Boyd dictated a far-reaching Fourth Amendment
protection.91 Over time, the “trespass doctrine” began to be used more
frequently, which had more specific language that “focused on the
textual language of ‘persons, houses, papers, and effects.’”92

Lipez, supra note 71, at 226.
Id. at 226.
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L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 175, 177 (2017); 18 U.S.C.S. § 2701 (LexisNexis through
2017); Pub. L. No. 99–508, 100 Stat. 1848.
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L. REV. 547, 568 (2017).
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Id. at 569.
91
Id. at 569–70.
92
Id.
84
85

505

2019

Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs

7:2

The Supreme Court decision in Katz v. United States in 1967 yet
again altered the expectation of privacy standard.93 In Katz, law
enforcement officials placed a listening device on the exterior of a
telephone booth, which the defendant argued was a violation of the
Fourth Amendment as it was a constitutionally protected area.94 The
Court in Katz established that the “reasonable expectation of privacy
test has controlled the threshold analysis of whether a Fourth
Amendment search has occurred.”95 The test contains two parts: (1)
“that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of
privacy,” and (2) “that the expectation be one that society is prepared
to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”96 This analysis was significant because it
acknowledged a presence of a “constitutionally protected interest
separate from any place and distinct from tangible property.”97
United States v. Jones was decided by the Supreme Court in 2012
and is yet another significant case in the establishment of a balance
between privacy and surveillance.98 In Jones, the government installed a
GPS tracking device on Jones’ vehicle and tracked it for twenty-eight
days.99 The concurrences in this case addressed the privacy and
surveillance balance within the Katz “reasonable expectation of
privacy” doctrine, which “found that the GPS tracking constituted a
search under the Fourth Amendment.”100 The Court revealed a
growing concern for the increase of technology in our digital society
and how it has the potential to aggregate and impact our fundamental
rights and expectations of privacy.101
As society’s expectations have developed over time and
technology has advanced, citizens’ media and sousveillance have made
their way to the forefront of the discussion on surveillance and privacy.
Recent cases, such as the cases of Rodney King and Oscar Grant,
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967).
Scott, supra note 14, at 158.
95
Ferguson, supra note 89, at 571.
96
Scott, supra note 14, at 158.
97
Ferguson, supra note 89, at 570 n. 125 (quoting Timothy Casey, Electronic
Surveillance and the Right to be Secure, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 977, 996 (2008)).
98
United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012).
99
Id. at 402–03. See Scott, supra note 14, at 159–60.
100
Scott, supra note 14, at 160.
101
Id. at 160–61.
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reveal the role of media—specifically the role of media in police
accountability and evidence in criminal trials. In the Rodney King case
in 1991, a bystander used a Sony Camcorder to record police officers
beating Rodney King with batons.102 The video recording was then
publicized on a local television station, which resulted in a public
outcry against police brutality.103 Thus, the ability to record and the
capability to access a wide network of people through the use of
technology illustrates how digital advancement influences our
thoughts on police and privacy. The Oscar Grant case in 2009 involved
passengers recording an officer shooting Oscar Grant “while Grant
was lying on the subway platform, supposedly resisting restraint.” 104
Unlike the Rodney King case, these recordings were subsequently
uploaded to the platform of YouTube, which led to its use as evidence
resulting in the officer’s conviction of involuntary manslaughter in
2010.105
In the landmark case Glik v. Cunniffe, decided in the First
Circuit, Simon Glik used his cellphone to record police officers using
what he thought was “unnecessary force to affect an arrest.”106 When
the police questioned Glik as to his actions, he responded that he was
recording the events and he was arrested “for unlawful audio recording
in violation of the Massachusetts wiretap statute” as well as “disturbing
the peace and aiding in the escape of a prisoner.”107 The case was
eventually dismissed, so Glik brought a civil suit.108 The Court’s
analysis in this suit constitutes the legacy of the Glik case.109 The First
Circuit recognized the “First Amendment right to record police
conduct in public places” and the Seventh Circuit echoed this.110
Before this right was established, if a “citizen visibly wrote down an
officer’s shield number, the result was often an arrest for interfering

102
103
104
105
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Newell, supra note 5, at 66; Lipez, supra note 71, at 223.
Newell, supra note 5, at 66.
Id. at 66–67.
Id. at 66–67.
Id. at 68. See generally Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78 (1st Cir. 2011).
Lipez, supra note 71, at 217.
Newell, supra note 5, at 68; See generally Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78 (1st

Cir. 2011).
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See Id. at 218–19.
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with a police officer or disorderly conduct.”111 This right to record
changed the “role of the citizen journalist” and along with the aid of
advancing technology, “fundamentally changed the nature of
policing.”112
IV. ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF SURVEILLANCE
One’s opinion toward surveillance will inevitably color the way
they describe the advantages and disadvantages so this section will
provide both sides to be evaluated and balanced for several common
methods of surveillance: CCTV, police body cameras, and
sousveillance.
A. Closed Circuit Television
Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) allows for the constant and
efficient aggregation of images and information.113 As technology
became more sophisticated, the capabilities and functions of the
equipment that utilize these programs expanded exponentially.114 Many
of the cameras now used for CCTV “are now fitted with full pan, tilt,
and zoom capabilities, and record in high-resolution colour, while a
small but gradually increasing number also utilize sophisticated night
vision, motion detection, and automatic tracking technologies.”115
Despite the benefits provided to law enforcement, these technological
advancements have some troubling consequences.
CCTV allows law enforcement to install cameras, which collect
data about the movements of citizens over a span of time, without
having to utilize vast amounts of manpower as required in the past. 116
This has resulted in “improved response times” and has promoted
officer safety due to advanced knowledge of the situation to which an
officer is responding.117 Thus, this promotion of efficiency reveals a
111
112
113
114
115
116
117

Id. at 224.
Id. at 223–24.
Goold, supra note 22, at 1-2.
Id. at 8.
Id. at 18.
See Scott, supra note 14, at 154.
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departure from the previous method of surveillance: the collected
footage permits law enforcement to analyze the data and subsequently
evaluate where to allocate their resources, rather than relying on
officers’ discretion and observations. Law enforcement no longer has
to weigh the “value and intrusiveness of the surveillance against the
resources required to carry it out” because the equipment is cheaper
now because of quantity and availability.118 Although the efficiency and
price remove several barriers for law enforcement, these can be
portrayed as disadvantages as well because it has consequences for the
public. As a result of this removal of the requirement to balance due
to the price, the threshold for justification of CCTV placement is
lowered and removes the need to contemplate resource management
carefully, which can lead to an abundance of cameras being arbitrarily
installed.119
Although the “cameras are not in and of themselves
intrusive,”120 the availability and placement, as well as the way in which
they are used and operated, have the potential to impact the general
public sentiment toward surveillance as well as the privacy rights of
citizens. With regard to use, the constant watch of CCTV cameras
possibly infringes on privacy rights deemed fundamental to the public;
with regards to operation, the ability to continuously record, collect,
and store CCTV footage and data through the use of technology also
poses some privacy issues. Data storage, the “archiving of police
footage,” has the potential to infringe upon the privacy interests of
innocent bystanders indirectly involved with the crime or disturbance
at hand because “the release of such footage under state disclosure
laws threatens to ‘embarrass’ innocent bystanders caught on tape.”121
Data storage also complicates citizens’ public expectation of privacy
because, although they might understand that what they expose to the
public is not private, “what they do not expect is that each of those
moments will be recorded and kept in perpetuity for later discovery
and analysis.”122 This contrast between an officer’s and a citizen’s
memory of an event versus permanent recordings presents both
118
119
120
121
122

Levinson-Waldman, supra note 15, at 565.
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Goold, supra note 22, at 210.
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advantages and disadvantages.123 Footage is permanent and will not
fade or become distorted, like a memory can, and footage can be
reviewed more than once “to yield the big picture.”124 However, the
“recording may pick up single, highly sensitive moments in time that
would otherwise be essentially anonymous,”125 and the public has the
opportunity to retrospectively scrutinize the actions of law
enforcement who must act with their discretion in the moment.
Deterrence is a widely used justification for surveillance;
CCTV allows the “police greater control over information and their
environment” by allowing them to assess the recordings and place the
cameras in areas where crime is frequent and they are needed.126 The
knowledge that cameras are present has the potential to deter crime
out of fear of being caught and having the recording used as evidence,
but it is a double-edged sword: the awareness of the ever-recording
cameras can create a false sense of security where citizens lower their
vigilance while in public, making themselves more susceptible to
crime.127 Additionally, research suggests that “evidence that
surveillance cameras deter crime is mixed at best.”128
As previously mentioned, CCTV’s ability to constantly record
aids law enforcement’s resource management, but consider the fact
that “one camera recording constantly over a 24-hour period will
produce 1,440 minutes of surveillance data, and if that camera is
located on a central shopping street, on a busy day it could conceivably
record the movements of literally thousands of people.”129 This
depiction prompts the common reference to George Orwell’s novel,
1984.130 Orwell notes this dystopian feeling that instills images of Big
Brother constantly watching their every move in the minds of the
public, which results in fear and skepticism of law enforcement and
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government.131 Orwell’s depiction of government intrusion and
surveillance has provided a “benchmark against which actual efforts to
establish a ‘surveillance society’ can be measured.”132
The right to privacy and anonymity while in public are
“instrumentally connected with restraining government power.”133
Measures must be in place for citizens to combat this interference or
to have “the ability to command non-interference in the first place,”
which would enable a balance between the conflicting interests.134
B. Police Body Cameras
Police body cameras are a newly developed form of technology
used by law enforcement which has come swiftly into the purview and
vernacular of the public due to the wide exposure these devices have
received from several of the high-profile cases mentioned above. They
have become known for their function of accountability and
transparency, but there are also drawbacks to police body cameras as
well.135 These devices are similar to CCTV but have different
implications for privacy due to their size, mobility, and proximity.136
Because of the intrusive recordings of the encounters and how detailed
the body camera recording is, disclosure could have “more egregious
results.”137
One of the main balances faced when using police body
cameras is the “clash between transparency and privacy.”138 The
camera is placed on the officer’s body and records the encounters the
officer is involved in; this promotes accountability, transparency, and
increased police visibility because the recording is evidence which
diminishes the deference given to police narratives, protects police

Id.
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from false complaints, and serves to remind police that they are being
monitored and need to act accordingly to avoid the repercussions.139
The footage from police body cameras can be used as evidence
“for or against officer or citizen misconduct.”140 The footage provides
accuracy and can be replayed, but this can also decontextualize events
and lead to “judgments about the wrongness/rightness of police action
based on small windows of reality that ignore some relevant
context.”141 These body cameras’ “recording encounters can help
rebuild public trust, improve public as well as officer behavior, and
protect against false complaints,”142 but that depends upon whether
they are being utilized properly. Whether the body camera is always on
or not also matters because there are corresponding issues, including
“[i]f body worn cameras are set to record as a default, they can also
take on a constant, pervasive monitoring role”143 versus leaving it to
the officer’s discretion.
Several other facets of body cameras need to be taken into
account including: they are “expensive to purchase and deploy,
increase administrative burdens, require both rigorous review and
supervisor action to reap accountability benefits, and their use may
decrease the quality of public-police interaction.”144 These recordings
have led to a turbulent relationship between law enforcement and the
public, so law enforcement image management has been made more
difficult because their actions are now subject to outside scrutiny.145
There is also a dystopian feeling that is invoked by the cameras because
not only are the police officer’s eyes on citizens, but the encounter is
being recorded as well. The relationship between the police officer
with the body cameras and the public was equated with prisoners in
Bentham’s Panopticon prison where they are have the potential to be
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constantly surveyed by guards so they unaware when they are not
under the watchful eye.146
These body cameras also give rise to various privacy concerns.
They “exact a privacy price” and may chill communications and inhibit
victims from speaking freely to officers because of the fear of
recording and data storage.147 The “risk of deterring victims from
seeking help at all”148 is not the goal of these devices, so the risk should
be considered in the overall balancing of interests in the use of these
devices. Another privacy concern involves innocent bystanders and
data storage—again, because the “people who, unwittingly, and
perhaps with no involvement in the incident being investigated, are
revealed on a widely distributed video” have privacy interests, too. 149
All of these factors and interests need to be balanced when considering
when and how to employ police body cameras.
C. Sousveillance
Sousveillance is a term used to describe citizens’ ability to
record events on their cellphones or other devices and their capability
to disseminate the recording to a wide network.150 Sousveillance,
meaning “watching from below,”151 contrasts with surveillance which
“evok[es] a watchful gaze over or above the subject.”152
Sousveillance has been utilized by citizens for privacy selfdefense in order to battle back against the concept of Big Brother as
well as to hold police accountable.153 This “ever-widening gaze of the
public” has the potential to promote deterrence by exposing the police
to public scrutiny and increasing officers’ awareness that their actions

Fan, supra note 3, at 407.
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may be recorded.154 The goal is to force the police to reflect on their
behavior and may result in an “increase [in] internal monitoring of its
behaviors and legal compliance” which may have long-term effects.155
Our societal dependence on technology results in citizens
being recorded on camera an alarming amount of times whether it is
“in selfies, in group photos, in recorded events, and more.”156 A
statistic from 2014 shows that, on average, “every day people uploaded
1.8 billion digital images—a total of 657 billion photos a year.”157 This
abundance of sousveillance has the potential to be used as evidence in
a trial; as mentioned above, FOIA allows for the disclosure of the
recordings and photographs produced from surveillance and
sousveillance.158 Although these photographs and recordings can be
used for the purpose of police accountability and transparency,
constant exposure not only to government surveillance but also to
other citizens’ sousveillance compounds the dystopian feeling of being
constantly watched, both knowingly and unknowingly.
Similar to body cameras, those citizens using sousveillance
must also recognize the privacy interests of innocent bystanders “who,
unwittingly, and perhaps with no involvement in the incident being
investigated, are revealed on a widely distributed video.”159
Another factor to consider regarding sousveillance is the
uncertainty of protection for citizens who record the police and the
potential risk of prosecution they face when they do record. Because
of the rapidly changing field of technology, additional constitutional
issues are being raised “about what right citizens should have to
document and disseminate information about government conduct
Dustin F. Robinson, Bad Footage: Surveillance Laws, Police Misconduct, and the
Internet, 100 GEO. L.J. 1399, 1420 (2012).
155
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and the state’s ability to prohibit recordings by private citizens.”160
Since there is no consensus among states on this topic, “citizens
remain at substantial risk when deciding whether to pull out their
smartphone and record the scenes unfolding around them.”161 Because
the legality to record police varies by state, citizens may choose not to
act out of fear of prosecution, which will allow “abusive conduct to go
unverified and potentially unnoticed by those in a position to remedy
wrongs or provide justice to the abused.”162 If the citizen does record
the events, then they have several choices of what to do with the
footage: (1) they could turn it over to the police and potentially face
prosecution; (2) they could post it to the Internet and also potentially
face prosecution; (3) they could destroy the footage which could be
considered unlawful destruction of evidence and obstruction of justice,
or (4) they could keep it to themselves and allow the abuse to go
unpunished.163 Therefore, this uncertainty surrounding citizens’ ability
to record, yet again, places citizens in a questionable spot requiring
them to balance their rights and justice against the risk of prosecution
and allowing abuse to go unpunished.
The advantages and disadvantages of sousveillance such as
accountability, transparency, use as evidence, risk of prosecution, third
party privacy interests all need to be considered when deciding whether
or not to record, in the split-second the event is occurring.
V.

THE POSSIBILITY OF IMPLEMENTING THE U.K. SYSTEM IN
THE U.S.

Although the United Kingdom’s system may provide some
useful techniques for employing surveillance that can be used to help
balance the crime control agenda and the constitutional privacy issues
faced in the United States, the United States would be unable to utilize
the exact United Kingdom’s mass surveillance system. This would be
the case because of a number of contributing factors, namely (1)
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implementation, (2) no comprehensive option, and (3) size and
centralization.
A. Potential Problem #1: Implementation
Implementation of the United Kingdom’s system in the United
States poses a problem because of the timing and the nature in which
it was installed in the United Kingdom.164 Crime was a major concern
in the United Kingdom, so “politicians and policy-makers were in
search of a new solution to the problem of crime and, perhaps more
importantly, a way of convincing the public that they were serious
about crime prevention.”165
This shift in mentality with regard to crime needed to be in the
minds not only of motivated politicians and those in power, but also
of the general public.166 Thus, a centralized front needed to be put forth
on the pending problem of crime. This shift in mentality resulted in
the proposal of CCTV, which provided the assurance of crime
prevention/deterrence as well as a more effective way to analyze where
resources were needed.167 Only in the United Kingdom “did
government and the public accept at face value claims about the
CCTV’s supposed benefits. . . .”168 This blind acceptance, whether it
was because of the fear of crime or that it was pretty well known that
the Home Office did not welcome criticism of CCTV, allowed for the
rapid implementation and expansion of CCTV throughout the United
Kingdom.169 This quick, widespread employment of CCTV left limited
time for backlash and came at a time where crime was running
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rampant.170 The shift in rationale with regard to crime allowed CCTV
to become an engrained part of life in the United Kingdom.171
While the United States and United Kingdom share “[t]he
fundamental common law principles . . . traced back to the Magna
Carta,”172 the American and UK approaches to privacy differ. In the
United States, a balance between disclosure and privacy rights needs
to be kept. The values and concerns about crime and privacy concerns
in the United Kingdom when CCTV became widespread during the
1970s and 1980s were different, and technology has marched on. 173
Today, in the United States, if there was a rapid installment of CCTV
around the country, there would be many bureaucratic steps to satisfy
prior to installation and use, and an opposition would likely form
almost immediately because of the instantaneous access to and spread
of information. Therefore, there would not be as smooth of a
transition in the United States as the United Kingdom experienced.
B. Potential Problem #2: No Comprehensive Option
Transparency and privacy are deeply rooted in the United
States and are considered “two revered democratic values.”174
Protecting privacy is exemplified in the Constitution in several places,
and vivid examples of trying to protect it can be seen as far back as
preventing the quartering of soldiers in one’s home during
peacetime.175 Today, advancements in technology have brought
privacy, disclosure, and transparency to the forefront. But this is just
how the issue has developed in the United States; the development of
privacy, disclosure, and transparency “will rely on the legal system,
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172
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practice and culture of each country.”176 Each country has a different
history and different values which lead to privacy being an “inherently
contextual, culturally dependent concept.”177 An attempt to impose the
values and system from the United Kingdom into the United States
would not result in a seamless transition because “[l]awmakers often
create problems when they attempt to impose one country or culture’s
privacy sensibilities across cultures and individuals” because one size
does not fit all.178
The United Kingdom has no written constitution and no
general right to privacy, whereas the United States has a written
constitution and a fundamental right to privacy grounded in several
sources, including the penumbra of rights cited in Griswold.179 Because
the United Kingdom does not have explicit rights and there has not
been a lot of government restraint on surveillance, the “legitimate use
of CCTV and the limits that should be placed on public area
surveillance has fallen to local officials and police officers.”180 In the
United States, each state’s laws dictate much of the restrictions on
surveillance in order to protect citizens’ right to privacy.181
Sousveillance has become more of a common method utilized by
citizens for privacy self-defense to battle back against the concept of
Big Brother and to hold police accountable.182 The prevalence of
sousveillance changes the power dynamic between police and citizens
in the United States while in the United Kingdom much of the
decision-making is left in the hands of police.
The phrase “to preserve public safety” is often the rationale
used as a justification for government action.183 In the United
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Kingdom, the typical justification for the use of surveillance has been
the “security rationale” regarding public safety concerns.184 But
especially in the United States, this security rationale has been
considered “not persuasive, as freedom of expression and privacy
concerns have consistently trumped security considerations since the
dawn of the Internet. . . .”185 The public safety and security rationale
can be very easily manipulated and can be molded to apply to many
different situations. To allow the government vast discretion, with little
to no supervision or limit, is grounds for abuse. Therefore, more
evidence would be needed to bolster the reasoning for surveillance
systems in the United States.
The United Kingdom also has its own version of FOIA for
disclosure purposes, but the United States’ version of FOIA is
significantly more extensive: the federal government has one act and
each individual state has its own FOIA.186 This illustrates the emphasis
the United States places on the balance between transparency and
privacy.
C. Potential Problem #3: Size and Centralization
The size and centralization of the United Kingdom’s system
differ significantly from those of the United States. According to the
United States Census Bureau, the United Kingdom has a population
of approximately 65 million while the United States has a population
of approximately 326 million.187 To put into perspective just how
massive the difference in size between these two countries truly is,
California alone has a population of approximately 39 million, which
is more than half the population of the United Kingdom.188
Because the size of the population of the countries and the
cities within them are so drastically different, trying to implement the
Id.
Id. at 1534.
186
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187
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system and extrapolate it to such a degree would present great
difficulty. Even if the system could be executed, the effectiveness
would be significantly diminished because of the increased expense of
materials and resources needed to cover more territory—not to
mention the increased amount of potential opposition that could be
faced.
The United States’ system of surveillance is much more
decentralized than the United Kingdom’s due to its structure and
organization of government; for example, “[b]ody camera policies are
much more decentralized in the United States compared to the United
Kingdom, reflecting the view that criminal law enforcement is a
‘traditional state function[].’”189 Implementation of the United
Kingdom’s system of surveillance would be near impossible in the
United States without centralizing all the power over decisions
regarding surveillance to the federal government which would infringe
on the states’ powers and place federalism in question.190 Not only do
American values pose a problem for utilizing the United Kingdom’s
surveillance system, the size of the United States and the structure and
organization of the government do as well.
D. Potential Problem #4: Further Clarification Needed
In the international context, no overarching standards exist
that deal “with or that strike the balance between the use of those
enhanced investigative tools for crime prevention, detection and
investigation on one hand and the protection of the private life of
individuals and other related rights on the other.”191 Because of the
lack of legal safeguards and differences between each countries’
approach to the subject, there is limited clarity on the topic. A possible
remedy to this could possibly be achieved by developing some form of

Fan, supra note 3, at 422 (alteration in original) (quoting Mary De Ming
Fan, Reforming the Criminal Rap Sheet: Federal Timidity and the Traditional State Functions
Doctrine, 33 AM. J. CRIM. L. 31, 33–49 (2005)).
190
Id.
191
See Jemberie, supra note 176, at section 37.
189

520

2019

Wherever We Go, We Leave A Trail

7:2

“common language of privacy” to provide some stability and clarity
within privacy laws in different countries.192
As evidenced earlier, some of the case law in the United States
and the United Kingdom, including Friedl v. Austria, Peck v. United
Kingdom, and Katz v. United States, demonstrates how the lines are still
blurred with respect to privacy rights and what is considered public
versus private.193 This lack of clarity leads to a lot of discretion being
left in the hands of the courts because without standards or precedent
to follow, the court must conduct a fact specific analysis on a case-bycase basis. As technology continues to advance, these lines will only
become blurrier and the docket of the courts will become increasingly
inundated if something does not change. The law must keep pace with
technology.194
In order for the law to keep pace with technology, “nations
should aim to model future legislation within their countries on
existing internet norms such as freedom of expression, transparency,
and privacy.”195 The Third Party Doctrine and the Assumption of Risk
notion,196 which are currently used to determine when privacy rights
are lost, are both outlooks on privacy that are somewhat outdated
because they are not applicable to the very interconnected and
accessible way people live their lives now.197 These notions do not
allow their concepts to transcend through time because they did not
account for technology’s evolution. As previously mentioned, if the
citizen does record the events, then they have several choices of what
to do with the footage: (1) turning it over to the police and potentially
face prosecution; (2) posting it to the Internet and also potentially face
prosecution; (3) destroying it which could be considered unlawful
destruction of evidence and obstruction of justice; or (4) keeping it to
See Hartzog, supra note 177, at 960.
See generally Friedl v. Austria, 21 Eur. Ct. H.R. 83 (1996); Peck v. United
Kingdom, 36 Eur. Ct. H.R. 41 ECHR (2003); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360
(1967).
194
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themselves and allow the abuse to go unpunished. 198 These choices
place a lot of pressure on citizens and force them to decide whether or
not to record in the split-second the event is occurring.199 Currently,
citizens are left with limited suitable options, and many common
citizens do not fully understand the nuances of sousveillance law and
its potential ramifications due to the lack of clarity and unification on
the subject.200 Thus, promoting a more centralized, unified view, as
opposed to each state differing, would be more beneficial. Therefore,
if countries aim to model their future legislation on existing internet
norms, not only will this allow the countries to adapt to the changing
expression of privacy rights but these norms will allow for the
development of the aforementioned “common language of privacy.”201
Another rapidly advancing feature of the privacy discussion
that needs to be addressed in order for the law to keep pace with
technology is citizens’ media. Citizens’ media, if used correctly, allows
citizens to better hold police officers accountable, but it is a doubleedged sword.202 On one hand, it allows citizens to utilize their
individual forms of technology to promote deterrence of police officer
misbehavior, while the government is able to watch the citizens via
CCTV, body cameras, etc.203 On the other hand, it increases the
dystopian feeling of constantly being watched and a large cloud of
uncertainty also surrounds citizens’ media when it comes to the
protection available for citizens who record the police and the
potential risk of prosecution they face when they do record.204 Both
arguments can be seen in the above-mentioned cases of the deaths of
Ian Tomlinson, Rodney King, Oscar Grant, and Glik v. Cunniffe to
name a few instances.205 Therefore, proper channels for reporting
citizens’ media footage and sousveillance need to be developed in
order to make this feature more effective and reduce the uncertainty.
198
199
200
201
202
203
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This sousveillance not only impacts those recording and the subjects
of the recording, it also impacts innocent bystanders who happen to
be included in the footage.206 Because of the balance of privacy rights
and disclosure as well as the level of archiving involved with the
footage recorded, citizens media that is reported has the potential for
infringing upon the privacy interests of innocent bystanders indirectly
involved with the crime or disturbance at hand because “the release of
such footage under state disclosure laws threatens to ‘embarrass’
innocent bystanders caught on tape. . . .”207 Although they understand
that they are in public, they do not necessarily comprehend that they
will be “recorded and kept in perpetuity for later discovery and
analysis. . . .”208 This may be considered an unavoidable by-product of
citizens’ media because it is a split second decision to record the action
at hand so one is unable to obtain permission from all those in the
area, but perhaps there is a solution yet to be discovered.
An additional element to consider is the intrusive nature of
body cameras. When police officers wear these cameras, a dystopian
feeling may be invoked because not only are the police officer’s eyes
on citizens, but the encounter is being recorded as well.209 When police
officers come to an individual’s door wearing these body cameras, it
allows them to record and store details about that person’s home that
is normally considered private.210 The awareness of these devices
recording everything in their purview, both video and sound, may
result in citizens’ fear to speak, which will chill the communications
between citizens and police.211
VI.

POTENTIAL SUGGESTIONS FOR CHANGE

Although implementation of the United Kingdom system does
not appear plausible in the United States, there are other suggestions
of how to provide some clarity to privacy rights in the United States.
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Listed below are several ways to categorize data, consider the Fourth
Amendment implications in the digital age, and balance privacy rights
and disclosure, but none are without their respective flaws.
A. Suggestion 1: Houses, Papers, and Effects
The first suggestion to providing some clarity and adapting to
the changing times would be to consider a textual reading of the
Fourth Amendment. “Underlying the [Fourth Amendment’s]
protection of persons, papers, homes, and effects and behind the
expectation of privacy lies a desire to guard personal information from
government intrusion.”212 When looking at the wording of this text,
these recordings can be considered protected by the Fourth
Amendment because of the application of “persons,” “papers,” or
“effects.”213
To analyze this under the category of “persons,” one would
have to consider, as previously mentioned, that on a daily basis we each
create a digital footprint, or “digital self,” which reveals many personal
details about ourselves such as places we frequent, people we speak
with, photographs, etc.214 This record of information can be
considered to be a representation of us as a person and therefore that
information is placed within the realm of protection.215
To analyze this under the category of “papers,” one would
have to consider that digital information is the modern day equivalent
of papers.216 “Whether the data is physical or digital should have little
bearing on whether or not it is considered private.”217
To analyze this under the category of “effects,” one would
have to consider factors other than the digital nature of the documents
or files and their location, such as “the nature of the item, its

212
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relationship to other items, and whether the owner has taken steps to
shield the information from public scrutiny.”218
Although these categorizations propose compelling
arguments, the argument would need to be solidified in writing with
concrete yet malleable language to attend to our changing
technological landscape and the individualized nature of these cases
requires an in depth analysis from the court system which could
potentially lead to an influx of cases.
B. Suggestion 2: Informational Curtilage
Another suggestion to “guide future Fourth Amendment
analysis” is the theory of “informational curtilage.”219 This theory
would allow the analysis to be appropriate for the digital age in which
we live instead of the “physical intrusion/trespass test and the
reasonable expectation of privacy test currently in use.”220
Curtilage is “a protective area around the home that secures
the area from outside interference or observation.”221 This is typically
applied to porches or other areas that are so closely associated with the
home that they receive the same protections. The theory of
informational curtilage considers “the proximity/derivative
connection to the constitutional source, the steps taken to mark out or
protect the information, and the nature of the uses of that
information.”222 Factors would need to be developed in order to apply
this theory, such as what constitutes the home and what the parameters
of the surrounding protected area would be, and as previously
mentioned, the law needs to catch up to technology so it would take
time to implement this theory.223
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C. Suggestion 3: Multiple Factor Test
The United States faces the somewhat unique problem of
balancing privacy rights and disclosure. This has proven very difficult
and fact driven in the several cases discussed in this comment.224 The
constant advancement of technology has changed the amount of
information available and the speed at which one can obtain it.225 A
five-factor test using factors from existing case law to maintain the
necessary balance may bring some clarity to the dilemma.226 The five
factors include:
(1) the duration of the surveillance; (2) the lowering of
structural barriers to pervasive surveillance, reflected in
the greatly reduced cost of tracking; (3) the recording
of an individual’s or group’s movements; (4) the
elicitation of information from within a protected
space such as a home; and, as appropriate, (5) whether
the technology undermines core constitutional rights
and (6) whether surveillance technologies are piggybacked on each other.227
These factors allow the courts to use previously identified
factors, which creates less work from them and allows them to analyze
their particular case within an already established framework.228 They
also have precedent to rely on when making the decisions for each
individual factor.229
D. Suggestion 4: Limiting Video Retention and Automatic Redaction
The previously implemented possibilities of dealing with the
potential infringements of privacy rights due to body camera footage
were individual consent, officer discretion, statutory exclusion, which
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are all problematic and flawed.230 A better balance needs to be struck
between privacy and disclosure.
To promote a better balance, law enforcement should reduce
“the amount of video retained, by shortening retention periods and
narrowing long-term retention to videos showing use of force and
other events of public interest. . . .”231 Shorter retention periods will
place a time limit on the availability of information which will promote
a more fluid system and the narrowed long term retention time will
require officers to provide valid, evidence backed reasons to justify
why the footage should be kept.232 The problem this poses is similar to
that of the advancements with DNA now being applied to unsolved
cases in the past; if these videos are disposed of after a certain period
of time has elapsed, they will not be available in the future if technology
changes to increase our capabilities.233
Alternatively, “improving the way videos are stored and
deploying rapidly-improving software aids can reduce the
administrative burden of complying with Open Government/Records
Acts.”234 Although this does promote the balance of privacy and
disclosure, the use of software to perform tasks is not completely
unflawed when bearing in mind innocent bystanders and their privacy
concerns, which have the potential to be distributed on a widespread
video, the suggestion of automatic redaction rather than enacting
exemptions was broached.235 It was eventually deemed problematic
because “the current limits of software and technology make redacting
a herculean task” and quite burdensome for those involved.236 The use
of software will promote the connection between law and technology
but it still requires officers to attempt to predict future controversies
of which videos to retain which is also problematic.237
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CONCLUSION

When making decisions regarding privacy, disclosure, and
surveillance, there are many things to consider. Surveillance and
sousveillance pose double-edged swords with the benefits of risk
assessment, data collection, deterrence and solving crime as well as the
concerns of anonymity and privacy, the dystopian feeling, and data
storage. How surveillance is utilized and how the privacy of citizens is
protected varies by country, as evidenced by the United Kingdom and
United States. Each country needs a system of surveillance that is
tailored to the rights, needs, and circumstances of their citizens, but
overarching standards should be clarified so that they can be utilized
as guides. For the United States, a balance needs to be struck between
the government’s disclosure obligations and citizens’ privacy rights in
order for the system to be effective. Although I do not believe the
United Kingdom’s entire system of surveillance could be implemented
in the United States for several reasons, I do think that by examining
surveillance systems other than our own, we are able to learn things
from other methodologies and could potentially implement or
integrate some of the useful techniques into our surveillance model to
improve.
The amount of traceable information we generate increases
daily so safeguards need to be put into place properly to adequately
balance the availability of information with privacy rights and the law
needs to keep pace with the advances in technology. Michiko Kakutani
discussed a relevant example of this in a New York Times article when
she said, “[a] world in which Big Brother . . . is always listening in, and
high-tech devices can eavesdrop in people’s homes” and referenced
the Amazon Alexa device (“Alexa”).238 This device is one that has
infiltrated many homes and businesses within the last five years and
has many different features and capabilities that update frequently.
Alexa has voice recognition and is able to be connected to control
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2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/26/books/why-1984-is-a-2017-mustread.html.
238

528

2019

Wherever We Go, We Leave A Trail

7:2

various other technologies in one’s home, including the lights.239 The
abilities of this device are reminiscent of Orwell’s 1984 in terms of
potential government intrusion and listening devices if not monitored
properly and the implications of data storage remain unclear.240 This
potential source of surveillance is only one example of the digital
footprint we, intentionally or unintentionally, produce every day.241
Another example can be found in China where “170 million
CCTV cameras are already in place and an estimated 400 million new
ones will be installed in the next three years.”242 Although the sheer
number is overwhelming, this camera network is truly distinguished
from others due to its capabilities; the extent of the pervasiveness of
these CCTV cameras equipped with artificial intelligence and facial
recognition was seen in Guiyang, China when a BBC reporter “was
located and captured by the Chinese police in just seven minutes in a
stunt to demonstrate the power and effectiveness of the government’s
surveillance systems.”243 The rapid proliferation of these devices can
be seen all over the world but privacy and retention are several issues
to be mindful of.
Because of this rapid advancement of technology and how
often individuals interact with it on a daily business not only in public
but in their homes as well, future legislation cannot be static; it needs
to be malleable in order for it to allow the law to keep pace with
technological advancement.
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